Călin Georgescu represents the candidate who won the first round of the Romanian presidential elections on 24th November 2024 and the one who is classified as the favourite for the second round of the presidential elections on 8th December 2024. In the analysis that I will make here, I will try to present the most important information from the CSAT documents released and declassified by order of the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, on 04.12.2024 regarding the CSAT meeting that he convened on 28.11.2024. The documents from the CSAT report include ” CSAT Document of the Ministry of Internal Affairs”, ” CSAT Document of the Foreign Intelligence Service”, “Document CSAT Romanian Intelligence Service I”, “CSAT Document of the Romanian Intelligence Service II” and ” CSAT Document of the Special Telecommunications Service”.
SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (in Romanian CSAT)
The Supreme Council for National Defense is the “autonomous vested”[1] administrative authority of the state that deals with “the organization and unified coordination of activities concerning the country’s defense and national security”[2]. This fundamental institution for the coordination of national security is controlled by Parliament and presents a series of activity reports to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate whenever it is deemed necessary[3]. According to the Romanian Constitution, art. 119, the CSAT “organizes and coordinates unified activities concerning the national defense and national security, participation in maintaining international security and collective defense in military alliance systems, as well as actions to maintain or restore peace”[4].
CSAT DOCUMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
The CSAT document of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, declassified with no. 2081968/04.12.2024 represents a report issued by the General Directorate of Internal Protection. The information note states that the Tik-Tok platform “did not implement the instructions of the Central Electoral Bureau regarding marking as a political candidate, respectively marking electoral video materials with the unique code assigned by the Permanent Electoral Authority to each candidate”[5].
Name: Călin Georgescu used 5 times; reaches 9th place worldwide in the top trends for promoting associated video content.
Time range: 13th-26th November 2024
Keyword frequency:
1. “Tik-Tok” – 8 times;
2. “Far-right”/“ultranationalist”/“ultra-orthodox” – 6 times;
3. “influencer” – 6 times;
4. “Russian Federation”/“Moscow” – 4 times.
Findings:
1. 130 Tik-Tok accounts used to disseminate video content through the internal environment of some national influencers, using hashtags such as #equilibrisverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024 and #unliderpotrivitpentrumine[6];
2. Scenario used to create content elements similar to the one used in the elections in the Republic of Moldova: “part of the opening text used by Romanian influencers to promote the pro-Russian candidate in the Republic of Moldova”[7];
3. Association of the ideal profile of the president with the candidate Călin Georgescu;
4. Influencers are paid according to the number of followers: 400 RON (approx. 80 Euros) for 20,000 users[8];
5. Campaign supporters – exponents of the far-right ideology/fighters in the Foreign Legion (which deals with organizing paramilitary camps with the aim of radicalizing young people, using the NEO-LEGIONARY doctrine), “criminal circles and religious cults, previously involved in promoting pro-Russian, anti-Semitic, anti-NATO or anti-Ukrainian narratives”[9];
6. The hybrid operation in Russia has a similar action pattern “identified at the level of Ukraine, active in the period preceding the beginning of the aggression by the Russian Federation”[10];
7. Coordinated actions to affect the sovereignty of Romania;
8. The “Balance and Verticality” informational campaign is identical to the “Brother to Brother” campaign, used by Russia for the campaign in Ukraine and initiated through Telegram channels managed by an anonymous administrator. “In the Ukrainian campaign, each content item was paid 17 USD, and in Romania each influencer received 390 lei / 20,000 followers.”[11]
CSAT DOCUMENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
The CSAT document of the Foreign Intelligence Service, entitled “Analysis of risks to national security generated by the actions of state and non-state cyber actors on IT&C infrastructures, support for the electoral process” is an unclassified report extracted from Note no. 0654 of 28th November 2024 which informs us about Russia’s direct involvement in the electoral process in Romania[12].
Candidate name: Călin Georgescu
Keywords frequency:
1. “Russia”/“Kremlin”/“Moscow”/“Russian(s)”/“pro-Russian”- 36 times;
2. “NATO”- 7 times;
3. “Romania”- 13 times;
4. “Far-right”- 3 times;
5. “USA”- 2 times;
Findings:
1. Russia’s involvement in influencing elections has intensified in the West, starting in 2016, with a modus operandi oriented, especially, in the online environment;
2. Conducting detailed sociological research by Russia of the target states and identifying vulnerabilities at the legislative level;
3. Using information aggression and propaganda with the help of artificial intelligence “for rapid content creation”[13] through “official vectors, local trainers and troll networks”[14] and by “diversifying the techniques for spreading (pro)Russian narratives”[15];
4. Increasing the chances of candidates of the anti-system, eurosceptic, “pacifist” and nationalist extreme right by Russia through “persons or political formations” with pro-Russian views, organizing cultural events to promote Russia, fueling conspiracy theories, “manufacturing deepfake content to defame inconvenient candidates”[16];
5. Romania is classified by Russia as an ENEMY (“UNFRIEND”) state, and Russia adopts “a policy of active deterrence towards Romania”[17].
6. Russia considers the military potential of NATO and the US a challenge and threat to security, also invoking the issue of the treasury through which Romania would like to solve its economic problems, Romania being also a competitor in the Republic of Moldova;
7. “Romania – along with other states on NATO’s Eastern Flank – has become a priority for Russia’s hostile actions, with the Kremlin having a growing interest in influencing (at least) the mood and agenda in Romanian society in the electoral context”[18] through propaganda, disinformation, supporting Eurosceptic candidates, encouraging the spread of discontent among the population, with the aim of stopping aid to Ukraine;
8. “ROMANIA IS A TARGET FOR RUSSIAN AGGRESSIVE HYBRID ACTIONS”[19];
9. Journalists from Russia estimated that pro-Russian forces would obtain over 30% in the parliamentary elections on 1st December 2024[20];
10. Indirect (NATO membership) and direct (through information operations) approach to Russian propaganda by using narratives aimed at diminishing the population’s trust in the North Atlantic Alliance, discrediting NATO’s response capacity;
11. Modus operandi used similar to that in Ukraine.
CSAT DOCUMENTS OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE I and II
CSAT Document of the Romanian Intelligence Service I, Annex to no. 791180, dated 04.12.2024, informs us about an aggressive promotion campaign, aiming to circumvent national legislation in the electoral field and exploit the algorithms of “social media platforms for the accelerated growth of Călin Georgescu’s popularity”[21].
CSAT Document of the Romanian Intelligence Service II, Annex to no. 791184 dated 04.12.2024, informs us about the actions of a state cyber actor on the IT&C infrastructure of the electoral platforms of the Permanent Electoral Authority and the Special Telecommunications Service.[22]
Keyword frequency:
1. TikTok: 59
2. Călin Georgescu: 37
3. AEP/Permanent Electoral Authority or BEC (Central Electoral Office): 16 times
4. Telegram: 7 times
Findings:
1. Coordinated campaign to increase popularity, amplified 2 weeks before the election date on TikTok[23] platform, but also the use of the Telegram[24] platform;
2. Initial network of 25,000 accounts that became very active and organized in an exemplary manner[25];
3. 797 accounts created since 2016:
4. Unique IP address of each account;
5. Subscribers to some Telegram accounts promised instructions on the coordination of the campaign (platform @propagatorcg) with emojis directed at the public and with predefined tags (“#CG”, “#diapora”, “#calingeorgescu)”[26]. TikTok stated that the @propagatorcg platform was created on 15th June 2024, where 3,755 subscribers were trained on how to distribute messages and narratives[27];
6. Use of the influencer network and creation of accounts that “falsely represent Romanian state institutions”[28], such as the SRI badge and the title Anti-Terrorist Brigade;
7. Although TikTok transmitted the content regarding Călin Georgescu on Romanian territory to the authorities, the platform did not delete the electoral content;
8. Lack of appropriate markings;
9. A massive increase in the promotion of the Young People’s Party (POT) on the TikTok platform, a party that entered Parliament;
10. Evidence of financing of Călin Georgescu’s company: Romanian citizen Bogdan PEȘCHIR with 1 million euros and the involvement of companies (FA Agency) of South African origin;
11. Publication of access credentials associated with “bec.ro”, “roaep.ro” and “registrulelectoral.ro” on Russian cybercrime platforms and detection of 85,000 cyberattacks on computer systems from 33 countries.
CSAT Document of the Special Telecommunications Service
The Special Telecommunications Service CSAT Document, no. 611 of 29.11.2024, entitled “Report on the analysis of possible risks to national security generated by the actions of state and non-state cyber actors, on IT&C infrastructures, support for the electoral process” informs us about the role of the SIMPV information system, used for “the conduct of elections for the President of Romania”. I will not dwell on this document, because the conclusion is that “no vulnerabilities or malfunctions have been identified that would determine an impact in terms of the provision of communications and information technology services assumed by STS under legal, optimal and security conditions”[29].
CONCLUSIONS:
- Following these documents, the Supreme Council for National Defense had the following conclusion:
“It was confirmed that, in the current regional and especially electoral security context, Romania, along with other states on NATO’s Eastern Flank, has become a priority for the hostile actions of state and non-state actors, especially the Russian Federation, with a growing interest on its part to influence the public agenda in Romanian society and social cohesion […] The analysis of the documents also revealed that, in violation of electoral legislation, a candidate in the presidential elections benefited from massive exposure due to the preferential treatment that the TikTok platform granted him by not marking him as a political candidate, respectively without requiring him to mark his electoral video materials with the unique I identification code assigned by the Permanent Electoral Authority upon the appointment of the coordinating financial representative, an obligation imposed by electoral legislation”[30] .
- The US Department of State transmitted a very important message related to the upcoming elections, stating that they “are concerned by the Romanian Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT)’s report of Russian involvement in malign cyber activity designed to influence the integrity of the Romanian electoral process. Data referenced in the report should be fully investigated to ensure the integrity of Romania’s electoral process”[31]. Moreover, there is also a statement related to the fact that foreign investment would be affected, if the transnational values were endangered: “Any such change would have serious negative impacts on U.S. security cooperation with Romania, while a decision to restrict foreign investment would discourage U.S. companies from continuing to invest in Romania”[32].
[1] Supreme Council for National Defense, accessed at https://csat.presidency.ro/ on 04.12.2024
[2] Ibidem
[3] Ibidem
[4] „Contituția României”, Art. 119, accessed at https://www.constitutiaromaniei.ro/art-119-consiliul-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii/ on 04.12.2024
[5] „Notă de informare”, Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Directorate of Internal Protection, declassified with the no. 2081968/04.12.2024, p. 1, accessed at https://s.iw.ro/gateway/g/ZmlsZVNvdXJjZT1odHRwJTNBJTJGJTJG/c3RvcmFnZTA4dHJhbnNjb2Rlci5yY3Mt/cmRzLnJvJTJGc3RvcmFnZSUyRjIwMjQl/MkYxMiUyRjA0JTJGMjE0Mjk3Nl8yMTQy/OTc2X0RvY3VtZW50LUNTQVQtTUFJLnBk/ZiZoYXNoPTQyMTlmOWUxNWFiZDQzNmQ4ZjA1NjE5ZmM5NWE2Mjk4.pdf on 04.12.2024
[6] Ibidem, p. 1
[7] Ibidem, pp. 1-2
[8] Ibidem, p. 2
[9] Ibidem, p. 2
[10] Ibidem, p. 3
[11] Ibidem, p. 4
[12] „Analiza unor riscuri a adresa securității naționale generate de acțiunile unor actori cibernetici statali și non-statli asupra unor infrastructuri IT&C, suport pentru procesul electoral”, Foreign Intelligence Service, Note no. 1956 from 4th December 2024, , p. 1, accessed at https://s.iw.ro/gateway/g/ZmlsZVNvdXJjZT1odHRwJTNBJTJGJTJG/c3RvcmFnZTA4dHJhbnNjb2Rlci5yY3Mt/cmRzLnJvJTJGc3RvcmFnZSUyRjIwMjQl/MkYxMiUyRjA0JTJGMjE0Mjk3N18yMTQy/OTc3X0RvY3VtZW50LUNTQVQtU0lFLnBk/ZiZoYXNoPTAyNTRlYjI2MzgyZWRkOWVlNGFjYTI4NzJiNzQ5Yjhk.pdf on 04.12.2024
[13] Ibidem, p. 1
[14] Ibidem, p. 1
[15] Ibidem, p. 1
[16] Ibidem, p. 1
[17] Ibidem, p. 2
[18] Ibidem, p. 1
[19] Ibidem, p. 2
[20] Ibidem, p. 2
[21] „Notă”, Romanian Intelligence Service, annex to the no. 791180, 4th December 2024, p. 1, accessed at https://s.iw.ro/gateway/g/ZmlsZVNvdXJjZT1odHRwJTNBJTJGJTJG/c3RvcmFnZTA4dHJhbnNjb2Rlci5yY3Mt/cmRzLnJvJTJGc3RvcmFnZSUyRjIwMjQl/MkYxMiUyRjA0JTJGMjE0Mjk4MF8yMTQy/OTgwX0RvY3VtZW50LUNTQVQtU1JJLUku/cGRmJmhhc2g9NGMwMjA2NDg5NDM2OTNhMTkwMGMwOWEwMGYzOTVkNDQ=.pdf on 04.12.2024
[22] „Notă”, Romanian Intelligence Service, annex to no. 791184, 4th December 2024, accessed at https://s.iw.ro/gateway/g/ZmlsZVNvdXJjZT1odHRwJTNBJTJGJTJG/c3RvcmFnZTA4dHJhbnNjb2Rlci5yY3Mt/cmRzLnJvJTJGc3RvcmFnZSUyRjIwMjQl/MkYxMiUyRjA0JTJGMjE0Mjk4MV8yMTQy/OTgxX0RvY3VtZW50LUNTQVQtU1JJLUlJ/LnBkZiZoYXNoPTU0YTQ1OWVmOGE1MDI0MzYwMWM1MzU1ZDkzMjNkZTE2.pdf on 04.12.2024
[23] Ibidem, p. 1
[24] Ibidem, p. 2
[25] Ibidem, p. 2
[26] Ibidem, p. 2
[27] Ibidem, p. 3
[28] Ibidem, p. 4
[29] „Raport privind analiza unor posibile riscuri la adresa securității naționale generate de acțiunile unor actori cibernetici statali și non-statali, asupra unor infrastructuri IT&C, suport pentru procesul electoral” ne informează despre rolul sistemului informatic SIMPV, utilizat pentru „desfășurarea alegerilor pentru Președintele României”, Special Telecommunications Service, nr. 611 din 29.11.2024, accessed at https://s.iw.ro/gateway/g/ZmlsZVNvdXJjZT1odHRwJTNBJTJGJTJG/c3RvcmFnZTA4dHJhbnNjb2Rlci5yY3Mt/cmRzLnJvJTJGc3RvcmFnZSUyRjIwMjQl/MkYxMiUyRjA0JTJGMjE0Mjk4M18yMTQy/OTgzX0RvY3VtZW50LUNTQVQtU1RTLnBk/ZiZoYXNoPTVkZTRiYWNiMmE5ZGY3ODgyMDA4ZTQ0OTI1MWM1MmQ5.pdf on 04.12.2024
[30] „Ședința Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării”, 28th November 2024, accessed at https://csat.presidency.ro/ro/comuni/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1732806302 on 05.12.2024
[31] Matthew MILLER, “Statement on Romania’s Presidential Elections”, 4th December 2024, accessed at https://www.state.gov/statement-on-romanias-presidential-elections/ on 06.12.2024
[32] Ibidem
