D. The Middle East
There is a grand shift when it comes to the Middle East. For five decades, for the United States, the Middle East was a vital space both in terms of its geopolitical significance but also in terms of its economic significance. The Middle East was very important for the United States, not only in the geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union in the area, but also because it represented an important energy supplier for the United States. At the same time, Israel was the closest ally in the whole world for the United States, and it still remains so for the time being: “For half a century at least, American foreign policy has prioritized the Middle East above all other regions. The reasons are obvious: the Middle East was for decades the world’s most important supplier of energy, was a prime theater of superpower competition, and was rife with conflict that threatened to spill into the wider world and even to our own shores”[1]. The United States recognized that it diversified its energy supplier and that it will concentrates on the production at home and, moreover, the most threats within the Middle East were confronted with business deals made by Trump in the Gulf Region, with military means (the attack on the nuclear facilities of Iran) and with diplomacy (the peace accords between Israel and Hamas): “Conflict remains the Middle East’s most troublesome dynamic, but there is today less to this problem than headlines might lead one to believe. Iran—the region’s chief destabilizing force—has been greatly weakened by Israeli actions since October 7, 2023, and President Trump’s June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer, which significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear program. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains thorny, but thanks to the ceasefire and release of hostages President Trump negotiated, progress toward a more permanent peace has been made”[2]. In other words, the Middle East is not a region of high interest anymore because the United States made a strong footprint of its influence in this area, Russia and China thus losing this geopolitical space at the moment. The perfect statement for supporting the previous sentence is “America will always have core interests in ensuring that Gulf energy supplies do not fall into the hands of an outright enemy, that the Strait of Hormuz remain open, that the Red Sea remain navigable, that the region not be an incubator or exporter of terror against American interests or the American homeland, and that Israel remain secure”[3]. I also underlined the importance of the Strait of Hormuz for the United States some chapters ago. This strait is of such geopolitical significance for the US that it will do everything not to let it fall into Chinese hands. In this chapter of the approach towards the Middle East, defensive realism takes a perfect form: “We should encourage and applaud reform when and where it emerges organically, without trying to impose it from without”[4]. This was said in relation to the authoritarian regimes and the dictatorships around the Middle East.
The context in which the previous national security strategy was written was a completely different context, when ISIS was destabilizing the region of the Middle East and when it triggered many terrorist attacks on the US soil: “We have renewed our friendships in the Middle East and partnered with regional leaders to help drive out terrorists and extremists, cut off their financing, and discredit their wicked ideology”[5]. It was at a time when Iran was developing its nuclear capabilities and the Obama administration did nothing to prevent it and did everything to weaken the relationship between the United States and Israel: “The United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy market”[6]. At that time, there was little engagement from the United States to end the nuclear programme of Iran because of the weak Obama administration. The United States engaged itself to strengthen the military capabilities of regional allies and partners in order to counter the influence of Iran in the region: “We will assist regional partners in strengthening their institutions and capabilities, including in law enforcement, to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. We will help partners procure interoperable missile defense and other capabilities to better defend against active missile threats. We will work with partners to neutralize Iran’s malign activities in the region”[7].
E. Africa
When it comes to Africa, the strategy correctly identifies the fact that Africa is a place where the previous American administrations were not so concerned with geopolitical confrontation, but with spreading “liberal ideology”[8]. What the strategy is underlining is that Africa should be used to establish economic cooperation, mutually beneficial trade relations, and to ameliorate conflict between the regions[9]. The strategy mentions that economic investment, as a transition from foreign aid, would bring mutually beneficial advantages. This is a very important step for America because China established a very dangerous and malign influence within this continent. Since the year 2000, when the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation” was established, it constituted an important part of the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Since 2000, massive investments in Africa were conducted by China in various directions: infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, and natural resources. Now, China is the biggest investor in the African continent, with Chinese banks offering huge amounts of debt to the African countries in order to finance their economic and investment projects. Personally, I am curious to see what the United States could do anymore in the African region because China has an extremely vast amount of partnerships and economic investment deals under the umbrella of the “Belt and Road Initiative” However, I do not know how the investments will take place because the strategy specified that the administration will not make any long-term commitments[10].
The previous national security strategy described perfectly how the current state of affairs in Africa, which is still the same at the moment, is: “The demand for quality American exports is high and will likely grow as Africa’s population and prosperity increase. People across the continent are demanding government accountability and less corruption, and are opposing autocratic trends”[11]. The previous strategy also talked more about the malign Chinese influence on the continent, speaking about the corruption that benefits China in the area, the Chinese Communist Party doing a lot of work to transform China into its own workshop. The new strategy did not: “China is expanding its economic and military presence in Africa, growing from a small investor in the continent two decades ago into Africa’s largest trading partner today. Some Chinese practices undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments”[12].
F. ANOTHER NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY?
Before closing the article with a last chapter about what should be the next steps that the EU should take in the future, I want to underline a very curious document that was already made public in July 2025. This document is called: “National Security Strategy. July 2025”, presented by Michel T. Flynn and other people. The institute that published this strategy is called the Gold Institute for International Strategy. Michael Flynn is a retired US Army lieutenant general who was the national security advisor for Donald J. Trump in the first administration for only 22 days. He resigned because there were accusations about him talking to the Russian ambassador. Flynn is a very controversial person who was also associated with the QAnon movement. In March 2025, he called NATO ‘a thing of the past’ and praised Trump for speaking with Vladimir Putin: “<<I think what Trump needs to do is he needs to put on the table that the United States will walk away from NATO if the Europeans don’t understand what is at stake here,>> Flynn replied. <<You know, maybe the usefulness and the utility of NATO has, you know, sort of spent its full amount of whatever, energy, right, I mean, at this point in time, but NATO may be a thing of the past, and there may be—may need to be a new security architecture>>”[13]. He is also a frequent guest on the podcasts of Steve Bannon, the one who did a Nazi salute at the beginning of the year.
What I am very interested in is that he published this strategy four and a half months before the official national security strategy was published, and there are some similarities and some differences between the strategy from July and the strategy from December. The strategy from July is centered upon explaining how the authoritarian states (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) are subjugating American values, the American constitution, but also how these countries are influencing the American education system and what America is trying to achieve at the international level.
What I am particularly interested in is the view of this strategy in terms of foreign policy and foreign policy recommendations. And the section that is very interesting is the section that has to deal with NATO and Europe. On page 26 of the strategy, it is written that in terms of Europe, the US should “Revive European self-reliance by encouraging Europe to reclaim its resolve to defend itself and uphold its core democratic values, thereby halting inevitable strategic decline caused by ongoing dependency”[14]. Does it sound a little familiar? When we go to the next paragraph, we see another similarity: the relationship between NATO, Europe, and the United States should be based on “Fairness and burden sharing, shared degree of commitment, mutual benefit”[15]. About the importance of NATO, within the strategy, it is written that “NATO must adjust to the times and changing circumstances, or weaken and become irrelevant”[16]. If we read more, we arrive at the paragraph where it says that “We cannot see the logic in U.S. taxpayers paying for a rich Europe to defend itself”[17]. If we go to the Page 27, we see the most astonishing similarity between both strategies: it is written that Europe chose “civilizational suicide over defense”[18]. Does this ring a bell? The current strategy said that Europe is going on the path of “civilizational erasure”[19]. If we go further and see what the strategy writes about Ukraine, we can see its completely neutral viewpoint: “if it believed in itself, Europe could more convincingly: Recast the Russian–Ukraine war as an unnecessary, tragic <<civil war>> within Western Civilization. Convince or compel Moscow to end its war and return to building Russian prosperity at home”[20]. So there was no aggression going on, Russia did not invade Ukraine, Ukraine is not a victim here. But Europe should say that the war was UNNECESSARY and that it was a CIVIL WAR? How was that a civil war? Russia and Ukraine are two completely separate countries and populations. In 2023, BBC published an article of fake-news regarding the war in Ukraine and Michael Flynn retweeted a completely false piece of news that questioned even the fact that there is a war going on in Ukraine: “That post was later shared by former US national security adviser Michael Flynn, who added: <<I double dare anyone to say he is wrong>>”[21].
I believe these similarities are extremely interesting between the strategy published by the Gold Institute for International Strategy and the official national security strategy.
V. WHAT CAN EUROPE DO?
The last chapter of my response to the national security strategy of the United States of America for the current Trump administration will deal with the next critical steps that Europe has to take in order to survive not only in terms of economy but also in terms of its current structure when it comes to the European Union.
1. FOR UPMOST IMPORTANCE, NOW IS TO FIRSTLY ESTABLISH PERMANENT CONTACT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON ALL FRONTS: political landscape, economy, military landscape, and social landscape. Even though the United States is starting to focus on its Western Hemisphere, we cannot let the United States leave us with nothing. The nuclear umbrella of the United States is of paramount importance. This is why the European Union, but also the member states, have to come up with a common strategy to go to the White House and establish very concrete business deals that will keep the United States longer on the European continent. Even if the United States is moving its interests into the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere, we have to become closer to the United States as a reliable and serious ally that understands the mistakes it has made in the past when it comes to economic cooperation with the Russian Federation in terms of oil and gas and with China in terms of goods and services.
2. On the medium and long term, THE EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES HAVE TO BECOME A SINGULAR COUNTRY, A SINGLE ENTITY WITH MORE PROVINCES IF WE WANT TO SURVIVE THE GEOPOLITICAL WAVES THAT ARE COMING OUR WAY. All member states have to go beyond their history, beyond their historic past, and become a single entity in the form of the United States of Europe, a powerful dream of one of the most intelligent and most powerful men of all time, Winston Churchill. In order to do so, Germany has to cooperate with Poland, France has to trust Britain, and vice versa, and Germany has to work perfectly with France. There is no other way in order to be ready for what is to come in the future. If we want to compete with India, with Russia, with communist China, or with the United States, we have to become a single voice with a clear message to the world. The more division is to be found within us, the less credible we will be in the international arena. Therefore, the EU should reform the unanimity rule when it comes to the security policy because, when it comes to policies against Russia and China, Hungary, through Viktor Orban, and Slovakia, through Robert Fico, will always block any foreign initiative on behalf of the EU member states. Furthermore, it should establish a system in order to impose political and economic costs on the member states that are systematically undermining and sabotaging the EU security cohesion.
3. THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS TO COME UP AND FOLLOW A SOLID PLAN TO JOIN THE ECONOMIC DEFENSIVE WITH THE UNITED STATES AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA. Even though the Chinese could bring economic sanctions to the table, even though there could be political and economic turbulences between the EU and China, the EU has to understand that China is the main adversary and the biggest enemy that the EU has to face in the long run. The best way forward is to address publicly the fact that the communist China has to pay not only for its crimes of the Chinese Communist Party but also it has to pay for what it unleashed in the world in terms of a full-scale economic war. In the short term, the Chinese Consulates, which are strategically spread on the European continent, have to be immediately closed in order to send a powerful message that Europe does not tolerate when it comes to its interests in relation to the hostile and aggressive states. And China is a very aggressive state. In the long term, China has to be completely isolated from the rest of the world because of its toxicity in international relations. AND WE ARE NOT ALONE. In this matter, we have the United States alongside us, which is coming with a grand strategy not only to bring security to those strategic economic points, but also to surgically cut the Chinese octopus from the international economy.
In order to decisively reduce the dependency on China, the EU has to protect its supply chains as much as the United States is doing, now in the new alliance called “Pax Silica” among the United Kingdom, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, Israel, and Australia. Moreover, it has to diversify its trading partners, constructing credible alternatives to the Chinese debt-trap economic model. There are some big steps regarding India, and now, with the Global Gateway Initiative, the EU is trying to invest in Africa and in the Western Balkans. Europe should be prepared for a multipolar world, where the EU has the opportunity to become a relevant international actor if it resolves internal struggles among member states that are following only their narrow and fragmented national interest.
On the 3rd of December 2025, the European Commission put on the table an economic strategy of the European Union designed to strengthen the economic security of the European Union. There are 3 major risks identified by the European Union:
1. “A growing instability in the global trade and investment environment, marked by the rise of disruptive trade measures and export restrictions to weaponise dependencies;
2. A proliferation of predatory practices targeting critical supply chains and technologies, undermining our industrial base, some of which (such as State-funded overcapacities) creating new dependencies;
3. The continued deterioration of the security landscape, including in the context of Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and the rise in hybrid attacks”[22].
The strategy is based on 3 pillars: promoting competitiveness at the European level, protecting against rising risks, and partnering with countries that share the EU’s concerns. The most interesting sentence within the strategy is one that will trigger some concern among the local population but it is a necessary step in order to reduce the economic dependencies: “in certain cases, the EU, its Member States and industry will increasingly need to be ready to accept economic costs for the benefit of reduced vulnerabilities and enhanced overall security”[23]. Yes, unfortunately, every decouple from a main source of cheap labor and cheap energy has its costs, but it will reduce more risks in the future. And yes, there will be costs that will arise if this shift is produced. But it will be a necessary shift to decouple some sectors from China and other hostile nations.
In order to do this, the European Commission proposes 4 main strategies:
a. “Improving information gathering, monitoring, and analysis, as well as the capacity to anticipate emerging threats;
b. Deterring third countries from weaponising the Union’s dependencies;
c. Reducing our exposure to third countries that may weaponise such dependencies;
d. Preventing efforts to undermine our derisking actions”[24].
This strategy is very similar to the “Pax Silica” alliance made by the United States. If we look at the website of the Department of State, the Pax Silica Summit also featured representatives of the European Union, which is a very good sign of cooperation with the United States.
There are 6 main tools that the European Commission is using in order to reduce critical dependencies, and to protect the EU market from external threats: trade and competition tools (expanding diversification opportunities and establishing trade agreements between the EU and other actors on the international arena), resilience and cybersecurity tools (detect emergency situations and develop a mechanism to combat them), security and public order tools (control the exports and imports and ensure a clear transition process), anti-coercion and restrictive measures tools (meaning to deal with situation when third countries are imposing coerce mechanisms against the European Union), funding and restrictions tools and sectoral initiatives[25].
There are also 6 high-risk areas that the European Commission detected that would undermine the strategic security of the European Union:
a. “Strengthening supply chain resilience and counteracting high-risk dependencies in critical goods and services”[26]. The main areas where the EU is dependent on third countries in terms of goods and services are: “critical raw, processed and advanced materials, clean tech components, and mainstream semiconductors, as well as in financial services, pharmaceuticals, aeronautics, digital and space technologies”[27] and the agri-food sector[28]. The strategy is publicly recognizing that the level of dependency of the EU on third countries (and we know that China is the biggest of them all is MORE THAN 60%[29]! At the same time, the strategy is also saying that a particular country has already weaponized the dependencies against the European Union[30]. Without mentioning the country (there is a lack of courage here), the EU is recognizing that China is constantly threatening the EU in terms of critical materials that are vital for the economy of the EU. The strategy also gives a set of examples that certain sectors are extremely vulnerable, but the most interesting one is: “penetrating telecom networks, reliance on a single cloud provider, kill switches of digital services”[31]. This means that China not only creates mechanisms to disrupt certain supply chains, but it also enters the private autonomy of every individual who uses any kind of good or service coming from communist China. This means not only WI-FI Networks, but also key technological goods and services (public transportation, mobile phones, internet services, laptops, and computers). Another interesting example is: “affect Member States’ autonomy to develop and operate military capabilities”[32]. This means that CHINA IS INTERFERING IN THE MILITARY SYSTEMS OF EVERY EU MEMBER STATE. Here, there’s no surprise when, for example, Romania uses Chinese equipment to supervise key military strategic objectives: “Chinese surveillance equipment suspected of espionage in the US and UK is being used by the Romanian Army at strategic points”[33].
b. “Attracting value-added inbound investment that reinforces the EU’s economic security”[34]. When an attractive investment, the EU has to remain secure from sabotage or disruptive acts that could endanger national or economic security (“access to sensitive data […] access to critical infrastructure, access to dual-use and other critical technologies”[35]), not to disturb the local labour market and not to become extremely dependent on a single market;
c. “Supporting a vibrant defence and space industrial base and other high-risk industrial sectors”[36]. When it comes to critical dependencies on particular third countries, the EU realized its mistake made with the Russian Federation. At the same time, the strategy brilliantly mentioned that there is a growing need to INVEST IN THE “DOMESTIC INSTRUSTRIAL BASE”[37] (defense sectors, but also dual-use sector). There are 6 risks associated with this area: insufficient (internal) investment[38] (this is very true because the EU became dependent on China through offshoring its companies and capabilities), low production volumes combined with insufficient procurement of domestic technology for institutional infrastructure[39](the internal production was extremely damaged and dependent on external goods and services coming from hostile third countries), third-country nonmarket policies and practices that lead to distortions in global and regional markets[40](China), unjustified or disproportionate export controls from third-countries imposed on European products and technologies[41] (the export regime controlled by the Chinese Communist Party), loss of ownership and control due to foreign acquisitions, including in certain cases through portfolio acquisitions[42]and rigid regulatory framework and fragmented capital markets that neither facilitate flow of funds nor promote the start-up and scale-up of high-risk / high-reward technologies with dual-use capabilities[43](here, the EU is to blame because of a hyper-regulatory framework that discouraged local investors and small-and-medium enterprises, therefore these potential investors going oversees). The EU is perfectly underlining that these dependencies in the defense and dual-use critical sectors could become a vulnerability for the EU in the case of a grand geopolitical conflict between the EU and another third country. For example, if Russia attacks NATO and, subsequently, the EU, China will 100% intervene in an indirect manner for Russia and will begin to exploit the vulnerabilities that the EU created for itself. There is also a series of objectives to be performed by the European Commission. The most important 3 objectives, in my opinion, are not only to encourage public-private investment but also to stop the relocation of critical and strategic sectors, to eliminate any hostile actor from defense (and also to limit the trade on critical goods and services), and to make the EU very attractive for companies from the EU member states[44].
d. “Developing and maintaining leadership across critical technologies”[45]. Here, the EU discovered something extremely intuitive, when it comes to the Chinese economic war against the West: “compromising the Union’s ability to compete in the technology […] reverse engineering, or industrial espionage”[46]. These are critical strategic vulnerabilities from which China profited for a long period of time, and it still is at the moment. For example, when it comes to critical tehnologies, foreign actors are seeking to undermine the EU technological sovereignty and they are collecting sensitive information based on illegal actions and activities: “Foreign state-backed or high-risk entities seek access to EU quantum computing, communication, and sensing know-how and infrastructures via investments, acquisitions or R&D partnerships, accelerating sensitive military/intelligence uses abroad and eroding EU technological sovereignty”[47]. Therefore, the EU is engaging in developing its own market in quantum computing, not only importing sensitive materials from third parties that may profit from trade secrets obtained in a controversial manner: the EU “will prioritise EU/like-minded funding and suppliers for critical quantum components and services, and limit reliance on high-risk quantum/cloud providers in sensitive sectors”[48]. An extremely beneficial objective for the European Union is mentioned within the strategy, something that will bring the EU member states closer in terms of laws, rules, and regulations. In other words, the competencies in critical areas and quantum computing will be transferred to the European Union in order to harmonize a set of rules at the EU level: “The 28th regime, providing businesses with a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules for company formation, governance, mobility and access to finance, will strengthen the EU’s economic resilience by enabling more secure cross-border operations and more robust, diversified supply chains”[49].
e. “Prevent access to sensitive information and data that could undermine the EU’s economic security”[50]. This is a clear high-risk area, one that is formulated very clearly: the European Union is BEING ATTACKED from outside (the Vice-President of the United States, J.D. Vance, articulated at the Munich Conference that the EU is sabotaging itself only from the inside). And now the EU has to strengthen itself in order to become more vigilant in the case of an attack. Now, the EU has a more aggressive formulation against the countries that are weaponizing critical infrastructure: “Third countries gain access to sensitive information/data of the EU or its Member States, either as a result of industrial espionage, their supply of hardware or software used in certain products […] or due to their ownership and control of certain businesses possessing sensitive information/data”[51]. And here, the strategy brings forward a lot of goods and services that came to be on behalf of the Industrial Revolution 4.0: connected vehicles, 5G/other telecommunication systems, electricity grid infrastructure, DNA sequencing platforms, port, airport and traffic operators, financial networks, AI models, data portals, telecom, personal data or sensitive market information[52]. The strategy goes even further and underlines that certain non-EU actors bought EU strategic companies which are operating sensitive information. The best example was the one I delivered earlier: strategic ports that China has bought within the European Union (Piraeus Port in Greece) through the Belt and Road Initiative.
f. “Prevent and mitigate disruptions to EU critical infrastructure affecting the EU economy”[53]. Third countries (China) are attacking EU critical infrastructure, which can have devastating effects on the European economy: “Disruptions could occur through physical-, cyber- or hybrid-attacks, including the sabotage of entire facilities or their parts/subcomponents”[54]. Therefore, the EU will block the access of third countries to critical information, limit the ownership by high-risk entities (China), limit cyber-vulnerabilities, limit dependencies on single providers, and “prevent access by high-risk entities to Union-supported actions”[55].
What will be the concrete actions of the European Union in this direction?
a. Improving the gathering and the process of analysis of information among member states[56];
b. Support greater coordination between the member states, including a more rapid transfer of classified information between the member states[57];
c. Creating an Economic Security Information Hub in order to monitor certain mechanisms and to gather information about the countries that are weaponizing the current EU infrastructure and its supply chain [58];
d. Recommendation for the member states to nominate National Economic Security Advisers at the EU level[59];
e. Create a trusted adviser group drawn from EU business representatives to, among others, advise on specific risks and potential responses as well as discuss de-risking strategies[60];
f. Include candidate countries within this process[61];
g. Diversify the suppliers at the EU level;
h. Provide help to the companies that are in need in this economic security context.
This could be the perfect starting point for the European Union to realize not only that China is an enemy of the free world, but also that the EU has to develop its own capabilities, facilities, domestic suppliers, mechanisms,s and instruments in order to become more and more independent on the international market.
4. At the same time, THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS TO COME UP WITH A SOLID REPORT WITH EXTREMELY DETAILED CHAPTERS ABOUT THE EXTREMIST PARTIES FROM EACH OF THE MEMBERS STATES AND TO UNDERLINE WHY THESE PARTIES ARE NOT PATRIOTIC PARTIES BUT PRO-RUSSIAN AND PRO-CHINESE PARTIES. We have to come up with a report in which there are detailed proofs about the connections and the relationships of some of the members with Russia and China, and how these parties are pursuing a direction that is in itself anti-American. If you act according to your personal wishes and you promote a policy that is incongruent with what the United States is trying to do at the international level, this means that you are incongruent with that administration. Now, one can have a legitimate dispute with some of the chapters, subchapters, sentences, or paragraphs written in the national security strategy. But when you come and write in your own manifesto that you are promoting a close relationship between the European Union or between a member state and Russia or China, this means that you have nothing in common with an administration that promotes the formation of an economic defense mechanism against the economic war against the West built by communist China. In my opinion, I do not think that some things are not known at the White House because what, for example, AfD (Alternative for Germany) is trying to do in Germany can be very easily read on their website. Their manifesto has very clear directions in relation to the Russian Federation and communist China. There can be possible explanations for this sort of phenomenon, and not all of them are positive.
We saw in the strategy that the EU is to be seen by the United States as a very suspicious actor that does not respect the freedom of speech or suppress the opposition. In some respects, I believe that there is a level of censorship when it comes to the “Green Deal” or to certain types of minorities that are not to be ‘disturbed’. At the same time, there is a level of censorship that is relevant, and that has to continue. And here I refer to the phenomenon of Nazism and Fascism. These are extremely dangerous ideologies, and yes, the state must do everything not to let parties, movements, or protests that glorify these horrible ideologies that are responsible for tens of millions of victims. Moreover, I think that the EU is not doing enough in this respect because Communism and Marxism are 2 other criminal and extremely dangerous sister-ideologies which have to be completely wiped out of society. They are also responsible for hundreds of millions of victims. But this does not mean that the European Union does not respect the freedom of speech. In Europe, you are not imprisoned if you come out publicly with an opinion, but there are certain rules to be respected. Of course, if you come with Russian propaganda and disinformation, you have to be combated through the national and European institutions. You have to be responsible for trying to subvert the national institutions. You have to be responsible if you try to sabotage the democratic values within the society. But that DOES NOT MEAN that the freedom of speech is not respected.
When it comes to the suppression of opposition, the member states of the EU do not suppress the opposition. I have to ask: why is, for example, Germany obliged to take into consideration the Russian and Chinese propaganda coming from the Alternative for Germany? However, what we have to do within the EU is to look at why the people are so angry with the way the political process works, and we have to look at what should be the nearest possible solution to resolve the immediate needs of the population. Of course, Russia and China will seize every opportunity to get involved in the electoral process or in the public debate in order to disturb the public opinion in favor of the one that pleases them and their agenda. However, we have to look at the reasons why the citizens are angry with the politicians, why there is a powerful public distrust, and what we can do in order to correct these issues. But no member state should be forced to make a majority with the parties that are suppressing the national interest of that country and that are working for the enemy. The EU must protect itself from forces that are trying to destabilize the democratic process and that are trying to cannibalize the society against its leaders. In other words, the EU has to battle with Russian and Chinese propaganda, but, at the same time, it must also pay attention to the reasons why these people are buying the narrative of the pro-Putinist and pro-Chinese parties. And no, in Europe, there is no suppression of opposition.
I will go further and say that the pro-Russia and pro-Chinese parties have to be forbidden; they have to be eliminated. Not because I want to establish censorship, but because we cannot have in our own national institutions a series of people with connections to Moscow and Beijing, people who have established parties and movements that are a danger to the national security of the country. There are a series of extremist pro-Russian and pro-Chinese parties around the member states. One has to find a way to eliminate these parties using legal means because these parties are not representing opposition in the classical sense; they are ready to change the democratic regimes in Europe to authoritarian regimes, such as in Russia. They are a danger to the constitutional order. They are a danger to our democratic system.
Why is the United States doing this? There can be all sorts of explanations or scenarios:
a. The national security strategy focuses mostly on commercial diplomacy and economic security. When it comes to foreign policy, the United States is reestablishing the spheres of influence because the strategy talks about a tectonic shift from the Eastern Hemisphere to the Western Hemisphere. It also emphasized the rebranding of the Monroe Doctrine. This means that the Western Hemisphere is to be directly influenced by the United States. We see in the strategy that the US will also be involved in Asia, in the Indo-Pacific region, in order to limit the Chinese influence. The new “Pax Silica” alliance, it proves that the strategy was put into practice from the first days. This could mean only one thing: that Europe will have to fill the void that the United States left. Does this mean that Europe will be left to the Russian sphere of influence?
b. Even though China is the most powerful adversary and we have to combat Chinese influence, the EU is also treated as a potential economic rival. A possible motive was described by me before: the traditional relationship between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation and China, on the other hand.
b. If the United States is willing to extend its influence also on the European continent, a more fragmented Europe will be more easily influenced and less capable of acting as an independent geopolitical power. And this is an element of “offensive realism”: in order to extend your influence and in order to have a monopoly on power, you have to try to seed distrust between the members of the entity you are trying to persuade. Because of a weaker Russia in terms of economy but a stronger Europe when it comes to its willingness to develop an effective economic model, some may prefer a weakened Russia to a stronger Europe. Yet this theory cannot be entirely true because, at the same time, the United States is pursuing a policy in which to make the EU member states contribute more to their collective defense, which meansthat, by itself, a stronger Europe will emerge out of this process after 4 or 5 years.
c. A presence of the Chinese and Russians in Europe can be tolerated in the short term if it undermines European strategic unity, this being another element of “offensive realism”;
d. There is also an ideological characteristic within this matter because the European mainstream political parties have engaged in discussion which are not seen very well in Washington. The discussions about transgenderism (an ideological nonsense and a dangerous construct), the acceleration of the ‘Green Deal’ (a deal that will make us more and more dependent on China and that supports an eco-socialist agenda), the multitude of genders and the gender ideology (another dangerous ideological concept) are provoking skepticism among the members of the Trump administration who are supporting a traditional way of looking at these matters. Therefore, the EU can be seen in Washington as a ‘globalist’ structure;
5. THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS TO DEVELOP A SINGLE INTELLIGENCE MECHANISM ACROSS THE MEMBER STATES. Until now, the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre, which has existed since 2002, and which is a directorate of the European External Action Service, reporting directly to the High Representative. INTCEN has its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and works for the development of early warning, collecting and providing reports based on open-source intelligence to the High Representative. However, the Article 4 Paragraph 3 of the Treaty on European Union establishes the fact that the national security is not transferred within the responsibilities of the EU as a whole, but it remains at the national decision-makers, a principle which hinders the activity of the INTCEN body: “It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security”[62]. If the intelligence activities and operations remain at the national level, there could start between the member states between the “need to know” and the “need to share”, dividing even more the opinions across the EU. Some of the countries could choose to share all the necessary intelligence with all the member states, but some member states could only choose to deliver some fragmented intelligence or even none. If the INTCEN body does not have, in the appropriate future, some legal powers to respond to current and future challenges as a unified EU intelligence body, it will further limit the cooperation and information sharing between the EU member states. In 2011, the INTCEN functions were transferred to the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy. Within the European External Action Service, there is also a departmental military intelligence body, called the European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate (EUMS INT), which is directly responsible to the High Representative as well and in which there is a subsection called the Intelligence Directorate that contributes to early warning and crisis response planning[63].
The presence of Russian and Chinese spies was already spotted by the European External Action Service back in 2019, according to the German publication WELT. The EEAS warns that around 250 Chinese and 200 Russian spies penetrated Brussels, working at their embassies and trade missions[64]. In 2022, the EU bodies suggested that the Belgian authorities strengthen their capabilities in order to increase their efficiency against the Russian and Chinese spies[65]. In September 2025, a Chinese spy, who worked for a member of the AfD party of Germany, was sentenced to prison for spying in favor of China: “An aide who worked for a leading member of Germany’s far-right AfD party has been given a jail term of four years and nine months for spying for China. Jian Guo had worked in Brussels for Maximilian Krah, a member of the European Parliament, for five years until last year. Krah is now an MP in the German parliament”[66]. I believe that there is a need for the establishment of an intelligence agency at the level of the European Union, which does not only collect information from open sources, but which has the prerogatives to collect also clandestine information and which can collaborate with the national intelligence agencies in order to spot the Russian and Chinese spies, when it comes to cyberattacks, clandestine mission or subversion, but also to tackle the other EU vulnerabilities (illegal immigration, transnational organized crime, terrorism or extremism);
6. Regarding the war in Ukraine, the European Union should deliver the frozen assets to Ukraine in order to buy the necessary equipment and the necessary weapons. The US is talking about a peace plan. Until now, what we have seen is a capitulation plan for Ukraine, apart from the security guarantees that are coming from the United States, which can be compared with Article 5 of NATO. The EU must do everything to help Ukraine in the war against the Russian Federation.
7. The European Union member states have to close all Consulates and all embassies of the Russian Federation on European soil and combat any kind of Russian propaganda, manipulation, or disinformation campaign. Because of the war in Ukraine, but also because of certain hybrid activities and provocations that Russia is doing in Europe, we have no choice but to close these centers that are designed by the Russian intelligence forces to serve as spy centers for the Kremlin.
8. The EU has to abandon the ideologies that are causing it to bleed: the gender ideology, the Neo-Marxist ideology (that is used in small circles and only in some respects), and it has to encourage, in an active manner, higher birth rates if it wants to remain economically viable and strategically relevant. When we speak about demographic decline, this can disrupt Europe’s workforce, welfare systems, and long-term security. The EU has to remain demographically sustainable if it wants not to put more pressure on the economic system and to increase dependence on the external labor force. Childcare support or fiscal incentives are perfect ingredients that the EU has to encourage at the EU level in order to remain a viable actor in the long term.
9. The EU has to recognize the fact that the illegal migration problem is a very important one. The recent terrorist attacks from 2023 and 2024, as well as the increasing robberies and thefts, have to be perfectly controlled and mitigated. Europe created its own vulnerability: not by accepting people who were leaving their country because of torture, hunger, or the state’s excessive control, but by the fact that this process was not a controlled one. Many migrants came illegally, and they disturbed local communities and put pressure on the security systems of the member states. Therefore, measures have to be taken that will ensure that illegal immigration is stopped at the border and that the migrants that are inside the European Union respect national laws, rules, and regulations; if they do not conform to society, some measures have to be taken. One of the reasons that the pro-Putinist parties have gained power throughout the years is the fact that the governments did not control illegal migration.
10. The European Union has to eliminate all apps that are in connection with the Chinese Communist Party. From Temu and Shein to TikTok, all three apps, products, goods, and services are directly linked to the Chinese communist administration and to the Chinese Communist Party.
11. The European Union was grounded on a Christian tradition. For 2000 years, the Christian tradition represented a very important part of our community. We have to guarantee the liberty of all the other religions of the world; at the same time, we have to respect and conserve the Christian values within our member states. We have to respect the separation between Church and state, we have to know all the excesses of the Christian churches from the Middle Ages and afterwards, but this does not mean that Christian values do not remain the same.
In conclusion, the new National Security Strategy of the United States represents a tectonic shift. From a state that represented not only the eyes and ears for the European continent but also a state that ensured that no threat would enter the European continent, the perception of the international community on what the US stands for today is very disputed. A strategy based on economic security and on commercial diplomacy, a strategy setting clearly the priorities and the foreign policy mechanism in terms of how does the United States see the world today, a strategy based on countering Chinese influence, guarding the most strategic points of the planet, the United States is saying ‘Farewell’ to its role as the sole guardian of the international arena and it is shifting its priorities upon the Western Hemisphere, and the Indo-Pacific. Multipolarity has officially come because the US is no longer the sole power on this planet. China, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and a rising India represent regional centers of power. China also represents an international power, one that wants to be feared by other nations on the globe. If the United States remains true to defending its sphere from the Chinese influence, if the European Union continues to defend its interests and block the way for China to enter even more the European soil, and if the United States and the European Union do not become rivals but try to find some common ground, even though both have made huge mistakes over the years, I think that the Western civilization will not be in decline but will succeed in blocking Russia and China to conquer what remains free on this Earth. Freedom, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and human rights are key international values that we have to defend.
[1] Ibidem, p. 26
[2] Ibidem, p. 27
[3] Ibidem, p. 28
[4] Ibidem, p. 28
[5] Ibidem, p. I
[6] Ibidem p. 48
[7] Ibidem, p. 50
[8] Ibidem, p. 29
[9] Ibidem, p. 29
[10] Ibidem, p. 29
[11] Ibidem, p. 52
[12] Ibidem, p. 52
[13] David EDWARDS, “’U.S. will walk’: Mike Flynn says NATO ‘a thing of the past’ as he calls to embrace Putin”, Raw Story, accessed at https://www.rawstory.com/michael-flynn-nato/ on 14.12.2025
[14] Michael T. FLYNN, “NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY”, The Gold Institute for International Strategy, July 2025, p. 26, accessed at https://goldiis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/f90b043c-6e5a-11f0-b985-0242ac110002-National_Security_Strategy.pdf on 14.12.2025
[15] Ibidem, p. 26
[16] Ibidem, p. 26
[17] Ibidem, p. 26
[18] Ibidem, p. 27
[19] Ibidem, p. 27
[20] Ibidem, p. 27
[21] Alistair COLEMAN & Shayan SARDARIZADEH, “Ukraine war: Viral conspiracy theories falsely claim the war is fake”, BBC, 27th February 2023, accessed at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64789737 on 14.12.2025
[22] “JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Strengthening EU economic security”, European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, 3.12.2025 JOIN(2025) 977, p. 1, accessed at finahttps://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/7fc51410-46a1-4871-8979-20cce8df0896/library/777b1ecb-e7ce-4774-a92c-53f81e64ce76/details?open=true on 14.12.2025
[23] Ibidem, p. 1
[24] Ibidem, pp. 1-2
[25] Ibidem, p. 3
[26] Ibidem, p. 5
[27] Ibidem, p. 5
[28] Ibidem, p. 6
[29] Ibidem, p. 5
[30] Ibidem, p. 5
[31] Ibidem, p. 6
[32] Ibidem, p. 6
[33] Ionut BENEA, “Ochi chinezești la Deveselu. Sistemele de supraveghere din China, interzise în SUA și UK, veghează unitățile Armatei Române”, Europa Libera, 18th February 2024, accessed at https://romania.europalibera.org/a/tara-in-service-camere-de-supraveghere-chinezesti-armata/32821111.html on 14.12.2025
[34] Ibidem, p. 7
[35] Ibidem, p. 7
[36] Ibidem, p. 8
[37] Ibidem, p. 8
[38] Ibidem, p. 8
[39] Ibidem, p. 8
[40] Ibidem, p. 8
[41] Ibidem, p. 8
[42] Ibidem, p. 8
[43] Ibidem, p. 8
[44] Ibidem, p. 9
[45] Ibidem, p. 9
[46] Ibidem, p. 9
[47] Ibidem, p. 9
[48] Ibidem, p. 9
[49] Ibidem, p. 10
[50] Ibidem, p. 10
[51] Ibidem, p. 10
[52] Ibidem, p. 10
[53] Ibidem, p. 11
[54] Ibidem, p. 11
[55] Ibidem, p. 11
[56] Ibidem, p. 12
[57] Ibidem, p. 12
[58] Ibidem, p. 13
[59] Ibidem, p. 13
[60] Ibidem, p. 14
[61] Ibidem, p. 14
[62] “Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union”, p. 18, accessed at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF on 14.12.2025
[63] “The European Union Military Staff – Intelligence Directorate”, accessed at
https://e-d-n.eu/index.php/2021/03/14/the-european-union-military-staff-intelligence-directorate/ on 14.12.2025
[64] Christoph B. SCHILTZ, “Hunderte Spione in Brüssel – Von dem Betreter einige Lokale wird gewarnt”, Welt.de, 09.02.2019, accessed at https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article188487901/Europaeische-Union-Russische-und-chinesische-Spione-in-Bruessel.html on 14.12.2025
[65] Lauren WALKER, “EU calls on Belgium to strengthen anti-espionage efforts”, The Brussels Times, 12th March 2022, accessed at https://www.brusselstimes.com/210379/eu-calls-on-belgium-to-strengthen-anti-espionage-efforts on 23.01.2023
[66] Paul KIRBY and Bethany BELL, “Former aide to far-right German politician jailed for spying for China”, accessed at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c99g52y7k1xo on 14.12.2025
