III. The core principles and priorities of the National Security Strategy of 2025 and key differences in comparison with the National Security Strategy of 2017. Flexible realism vs principled realism
The previous national security strategy is talking about 4 main responsibilities/pillars: “protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life”[1], “promote American prosperity”[2], “preserve peace through strength”[3], and “advance American influence”[4]. These responsibilities/pillars have targeted subchapters that describe the broader context and the main action lines that America should follow. The new security strategy talks about principles, not responsibilities or pillars.
The fourth chapter of the new national security strategy of 2025 is called simply “The Strategy”. The first subchapter of this chapter is called “Principles”, which embodies a series of 10 principles which stay at the basis of American internal and foreign policy. But first things first. Before discussing the principles, there is one important comment that I would like to stress: the enthronement of Donald J. Trump as the “President of Peace”. He wants to remain in history as the president who stopped all wars on the planet. Of course, he has some merits when we look at the number of wars he has put to an end:
1. Cambodia and Thailand;
2. Kosovo and Serbia;
3. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda;
4. Pakistan and India;
5. Israel and Iran;
6. Egypt and Ethiopia;
7. Armenia and Azerbaijan;
8. The War in Gaza.
Some of these wars were perfect also for the Russian Federation and the communist China. For example, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan was a strategic advantage for Russia because it could extend its influence and money to both sides of the war. Because the US ended this historic conflict and it has already signed a few business deals, the Russian influence in the Caucasus has diminished. And, with it, the influence of communist China. Because of the many economic problems that Russia faces, its economy has become totally dependent on the Chinese benevolence. Moreover, there was a strategic shift when we speak about Central Asia. In November 2025, we see the leaders of the 5 Central Asian countries at the White House: the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This means the fact that the United States saw a gap when it comes to the historic influence that the Russian Federation had in the area of Central Asia. In the past, these countries belonged to the Soviet Union. After their independence, they still remained close to the Russian Federation. What are we seeing now? A powerful realignment of geopolitical significance because the leaders not only accepted the invitation to the White House. This means that the leaders did not think of the consequences of doing so. This means that the Russian influence within this area is weakened. What were the results of this summit? Of course, business deals between America and Central Asian countries. So the United States has started not only to diminish the influence of Russia in the Caucasus, but it started to have business deals with former Soviet republics, meaning weakening even more the Russian influence within this geopolitical area. Only to give some examples:
1. “The summit’s immediate results were impressive, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leading the way. President Trump on his Truth Social channel lauded Uzbekistan’s intent to purchase $100 billion of American goods and services over the next 10 years, covering a variety of sectors, including critical minerals, aviation, infrastructure, agriculture, and information technology”[5];
2. “Kazakhstan announced 30 deals worth a collective $17.2 billion, in addition to finalizing a $1.1 billion agreement giving a US firm rights to develop major tungsten deposits. Kazakhstan also agreed to sign on to the Abraham Accords, the signature Trump initiative to promote peace in the Middle East”[6].
This is also a fact that the Trump administration went to great lengths to diminish Russian influence in most areas. When we look at the Caucasus, the deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan not only settled a historic conflict, but it also shifted Armenia away from Russian influence and toward American influence. If we turn to the Central Asian republics, which, I repeat, have had an extremely close relationship to Russia, now they are making business deals with the United States of America. America is closing deals in the backyard of Russia.
The conflict between India and Pakistan would certainly help China extend its influence in the region. This could decrease the power of India, which is in the direct interest of China. At the same time, Pakistan is one of the main allies of China in the region. China has built in Pakistan the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with over 60 billion dollars investments. In the case of war, China could arm Pakistan against a war with India, which would have as partners the ‘Quadrilater Security Dialogue’ members, meaning the US, Japan and Australia.
When we look at the principles of the new security strategy, we can see that realism is back on the table. But we will be looking at a new form of realism: “Flexible Realism”. The definition is given by the strategy itself: “U.S. policy will be realistic about what is possible and desirable to seek in its dealings with other nations. We seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories. We recognize and affirm that there is nothing inconsistent or hypocritical in acting according to such a realistic assessment or in maintaining good relations with countries whose governing systems and societies differ from ours, even as we push like-minded friends to uphold our shared norms, furthering our interests as we do so”[7]. In international relations, realism is the theory in which the state is the most important actor on the international arena and the national interest prevails over the interest of the international organizations but also the fact that states are pursuing their national interest simply because of the anarchic state of affairs on the international arena. The main elements of national power, when it comes to the realist theory, are clearly described by Hans Morgenthau, the father of modern realism in a book called “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, and the quality of diplomacy represent the main elements of national power through the eyes of Morgenthau. I have explained them in one of my previous articles[8].
“Flexible realism” is a new term used when it comes to the political spectrum of the realist international theory. As I see it, it is a type of realism which maintains its core characteristics (the elements of national power and the elements of national interest and the primacy of the state), but it shows flexibility when it comes to how America would act on the international arena regarding different actors. I believe that “Flexible Realism” is a predominance of “Defensive Realism” with some points of “Offensive Realism”. Both are taking into account that the international arena is driven not by international norms and principles established by international organizations but only by the national interest of the state which should be either to maximize its power in order to become a hegemon and, therefore, to prevent other states to become hegemons as well (offensive realism) or to seek for enough power to guarantee their full security, but not no over-extend and to trigger escalation (defensive realism).
On the one hand, what are the main characteristics of offensive (neo)realism? The theoretician of this theory is John J. Mearsheimer, of whom I will also discuss later when it comes to Europe and the war in Ukraine. He spoke about the offensive realism which has 5 main components:
1. “Great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system […];
2. all states possess some offensive military capability […]
3. states can never be certain about the intentions of other states […]
4. the main goal of states is survival […]
5. states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival”[9].
Apart from them, he argues that the maximization of power remains the ultimate solution for a state to survive within the ‘dangerous’[10] world as he calls it: “states quickly realize that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful. The reasoning here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely it is that it will be attacked. No country in the western hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the USA, because it is so powerful relative to its neighbours”[11].
On the other hand, what are the characteristics of defensive (neo)realism? The theoretician of this theory is Kenneth N. Waltz. Even though he would not call his theory with these words, many scholars did name it so.
1. Even though the state is a rational actor that has to survive in an anarchic system, the first concern of the state is its own security: “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system”[12];
2. When it comes to the concept of power, too much power can be a problem because other actors might react in order to limit your power because it has reached a too high level: “balances of power tend to form whether some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal domination”[13];
3. Anarchy is the absence of a central, higher authority above states, not necessarily only chaos and disorder: “If anarchy is identified with chaos, destruction, and death, then the distinction between anarchy and government does not tell us much”[14];
4. Dependency is a close relationship to security: “states seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency”[15].
In other words, offensive realism speaks for the maximization of power, while defensive realism speaks for the maximization of security. The national security strategy of 2025 uses a predominant form of “defensive realism” with some points of offensive realism.
In the strategy, the US is recognizing the fact that we live in a MULTIPOLAR world. The fact that the United States recognizes the phenomenon of “MULTIPOLARITY” is a characteristic of defensive realism. The problem is that the multipolar system that already took shape is not controlled by any international organization, which means that the current level of anarchy among states is rising. The next 3 principles in the strategy are directly linked to defensive realism: “Primacy of Nations”, “Sovereignty and Respect”, and the “Balance of Power”. When speaking of the balance of power system, the US is recognizing that there are also other nations that have their influence in the world, and it is right to do so. The US will not intervene anymore in the affairs of others, or, in other words, the US will maintain its influence where its interests lie, not being an international guardian anymore: “The United States cannot allow any nation to become so dominant that it could threaten our interests. We will work with allies and partners to maintain global and regional balances of power to prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries. As the United States rejects the ill-fated concept of global domination for itself, we must prevent the global, and in some cases even regional, domination of others”[16]. The principle called “Predisposition to Non-Interventionism” is also a characteristic of defensive realism.
Some examples from the strategy that are characteristic of both types of realism will be described when I describe how the US views its priorities in terms of foreign policy.
In the previous national security strategy, there was another type of realism: “Principled realism”. This maintains also the general characteristics of realism, but it is a realism that takes into consideration moral values and principles: “It is a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology. It is based upon the view that peace, security, and prosperity depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate to advance peace abroad. And it is grounded in the realization that American principles are a lasting force for good in the world”[17]. When the previous national security strategy talks about “balance of power”, it does it in a manner to link itself also with its allies and partners. Here is another key difference because it says that even though we are preserving our national interest and we are recognizing that the world today is a balance-of-power-system (defensive realism), we are not disengaging from the relationship with our allies and partners: “We will promote a balance of power that favors the United States, our allies, and our partners. We will never lose sight of our values and their capacity to inspire, uplift, and renew”[18]. So, we see here exactly the opposite: “Flexible Realism” vs “Principled Realism”.
Another principle of the new strategy is a “Focused Definition of the National Interest”. In other words, this means that the national strategy must have a scope, a target: “But to focus on everything is to focus on nothing. America’s core national security interests shall be our focus”[19]. “Peace through strength” is another principle/responsibility that both strategies have in common. The new strategy understands “peace through strength” in this way: “strength can enable us to achieve peace, because parties that respect our strength often seek our help and are receptive to our efforts to resolve conflicts and maintain peace”[20]. In other words, we are not engaging anymore on the international arena, but other states can call us if they need us. Therefore, we engage either if someone needs us or if we feel threatened and we need to intervene. The next principle listed in the strategy underlines what I have said. It is called “Predisposition in Non-Interventionism”, which could also be a characteristic of defense realism. The explanation comes with the principle: “this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention”[21]. The previous strategy also has a little element of offensive realism: “preserve peace through strength by rebuilding our military so that it remains preeminent, deters our adversaries, and if necessary, is able to fight and win. We will compete with all tools of national power to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power. We will strengthen America’s capabilities—including in space and cyberspace—and revitalize others that have been neglected”[22].
Other principles mentioned in the current strategy are “Pro-American Worker”, “Competence and Merit”, and the principle of “fairness” in international relations, meaning the fact that the US recognizes that, for a long time, there has been a trade imbalance between the US and other allies and countries (which is very true). At the same time, the US is expecting that all its allies should spend more of their national GDP in order to build their own defense systems and to “start to make up for the enormous imbalances accrued over decades of much greater spending by the United States”[23]. I will develop on this subject when we arrive at the section on foreign policy.
When it comes to the priorities of the new strategy, there are 5 main priorities listed. The first one is the fact that “The Era of the Mass Migration is Over”: “In countries throughout the world, mass migration has strained domestic resources, increased violence and other crime, weakened social cohesion, distorted labor markets, and undermined national security. […] We must protect our country from invasion, not just from unchecked migration but from cross-border threats such as terrorism, drugs, espionage, and human trafficking”[24]. Here I do agree because the European Union has been weakened not by the immigration process in itself, but by not checking properly the migrants coming into the continent, by establishing an uncontrollable process of mass migration, without establishing also an integration system that was powerful enough in order to set from the beginning some laws, rules, and regulations that each migrant must follow. Of course, no one would have any problem with people who are fleeing from war, torture, and famine, but the problem is that some are crossing illegally and are provoking terrorist attacks, some are trafficking drugs, and some are doing human trafficking. All these issues undermine the national security of a country or, in my case, of the European Union.
Within the first pillar of the previous national security strategy, meaning “protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life”[25], there are also clear directions in terms of the uncontrolled and illegal migration: “Strengthening control over our borders and immigration system is central to national security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and criminal cartels exploit porous borders and threaten U.S. security and public safety. […] The United States affirms our sovereign right to determine who should enter our country and under what circumstances. The United States understands the contributions immigrants have made to our Nation throughout its history. Illegal immigration, however, burdens the economy, hurts American workers, presents public safety risks, and enriches smugglers and other criminals”[26]. The difference between the new and the old strategy is the fact that the old strategy recognizes the role of migrants in American history. The new strategy adopts a more brutal tone towards this phenomenon.
The next priority of the new strategy is to protect the core liberties and rights of the people. It is underlined that the administration has given to the government “fearsome powers”[27] in order to protect the liberties and rights of the people, but those powers should never be abused. Then the strategy makes an antithesis with the “elite-driven, anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties in Europe, the Anglosphere, and the rest of the democratic world, especially among our allies”[28]. Saying this, the strategy adopts a critical tone of some of the censoring practices that are present within the European Union and the Anglosphere. Here is the first major issue that I see: yes, this is right, the EU has some problems regarding censoring some voices that are not in accordance with green policies, woke agenda, and other policies that are weakening the continent because of building more and more dependencies with the totalitarian regimes for critical resources of this kind. BUT why are the Russian Federation and communist China not among the powers that are censoring their citizens? The EU is doing it on a much lower scale than the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and other countries. The strategy speaks of “anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties in Europe”. I am asking: are these liberties present in Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran? Why is Europe the only part that is mentioned? Simply because the United States is seeing the EU as a potential competitor, because, if Europe were to unite into one singular country with a federal system, this would represent an economic equal ground with the United States. Under any circumstances, there is no expression or sentence or phrase in the previous national security strategy that is attacking Europe or the Anglosphere so frontal. But in order to understand what is going on exactly at this moment, the European Union has to understand also its own mistakes in relationship to the United States: not only an unbalanced relation in terms of trade, but also making deals with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China without thinking of the consequences on the long term, but only on profit, cheap labor, cheap prices, cheap goods and services and cheap oil and gas. Here, Europe has a lot to answer for. However, this does mean that the EU can be compared with Russia and China. There is no comparison in terms of human rights, human liberties, freedom of religion and freedom of expression.
The next priority is “Burden- Sharing and Burden-Shifting”. This priority is directly linked to the 5% of the GDP that each member state of NATO should direct to defense: “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment, which pledges NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and which our NATO allies have endorsed and must now meet”[29]. The priority goes further, stating that the United States will form “targeted partnerships”, meaning that cooperation in key areas will be maintained, but the burden will be shared by all partners, not just by the United States. This is an essential point because the world has to understand that the United States cannot concentrate its economic force only on contributing to NATO without the Europeans sharing the burden. So the EU member states have to contribute to NATO budget as well. At the end of this priority, the US is giving a form of recipe for Europe and for other partners: “The United States will stand ready to help— potentially through more favorable treatment on commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement—those counties that willingly take more responsibility for security in their neighborhoods and align their export controls with ours”[30]. Europe has to step up in establishing its own military system in order to counteract the Russian Federation in a possible war. This will make the EU to step up the military production and become a military fortress. Even though the EU member states were not used to paying for their security, now the EU member states have to understand that the United States does not have any obligation to support the costs alone. This means cutting some money from a part of the national budget and investing in defense and security. The previous strategy, within the third pillar called “preserving peace through strength”, is also talking about NATO to step up in contributing to the collective defense, but with a calmer approach, recognizing the role of the European nations to the international security: “The NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our competitors, and the United States remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty […] The NATO alliance will become stronger when all members assume greater responsibility for and pay their fair share to protect our mutual interests, sovereignty, and values”[31].
THERE IS NO MENTION OF ARTICLE V WITHIN THE NEW SECURITY STRATEGY OF 2025! This means that the EU member states have to understand the reason why the United States chose not to mention this within its national security strategy.
The next priority is “Realignment Through Peace”, a very important priority if we look at what the text is trying to say: “Seeking peace deals at the President’s direction, even in regions and countries peripheral to our immediate core interests, is an effective way to increase stability, strengthen America’s global influence, realign countries and regions toward our interests, and open new markets”[32]. In other words, if the US is striking deals, the US will extend its influence in the regions where the peace deals are signed. If the US has signed a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the US has assured its footprint on the Caucasus soil, diminishing thus the influence of the Russian Federation and communist China. If the war between India and Pakistan had been avoided, the influence of the United States in India is being assured. This is why we have seen the United States taking a more assertive stance towards India, not to buy Russian gas and oil.
“Economic security” is a key aspect of the strategy. The US is striving towards “Balanced Trade”, meaning to reduce the trade deficit, to act against the export trade barriers and to end the “dumping and other anti-competitive practices”[33]. “Fair and reciprocal trade” is what the United States wants in its relationship with other states. And this is a fair point. The trade should not only be free, but also fair. Another point of economic security is “Securing Access to Critical Supply Chains and Materials”, which means that the United States will do everything in its power not to be dependent on any nation for core materials and resources. In this matter, the United States will also involve the Intelligence Community, meaning all US intelligence agencies in order to supervise the supply chains and the technological advances around the world in order to discover possible vulnerabilities and to mitigate them. This is a very important aspect because there are some key strategic spots around the globe where the intelligence services could supervise the transfer of goods and services:
1. Malacca Strait: If you control the Malacca Strait, you control communist China’s entire economy because 80 % of their oil imports and 2/3 of their entire of all Chinese maritime trade are going every day through this narrow passage[34]. If there would be a conflict between the United States and China, China fears that the United States would block this tiny strait, paralyzing the Chinese economy instantly. Therefore, China is mad about building CPEC in Pakistan, which is part of a bigger and more lethal project, namely “Belt and Road Initiative”, a grand economic trap for whoever enters this project.
2. Strait of Hormuz, between Iran, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, is extremely important for the transport of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf to the Indo-Pacific Area, crucial for China, Japan, and India. If this strait were to close, then this would send a shockwave to the international markets because the oil prices will rise: “The Strait of Hormuz facilitates the passage of nearly 20 percent of the world’s daily oil consumption. A sustained closure would not only send oil prices skyrocketing but would also destabilize global markets, slow industrial production in Asia, and challenge military and diplomatic responses in real time”[35];
3. The Panama Canal, which was in Trump’s rhetoric right from the beginning of his second administration and rightly so because it has a huge strategic importance for the United States. Because Panama is becoming more and more dependent with communist China, this would endanger the US influence in their Western Hemisphere, the first priority of the United States when it comes to foreign policy. Why is Panama Canal so important? The canal is responsible for approximately 5% of the world trade, “40 % of all US container traffic traverses it annually, and more than 70 % of the cargo that goes through the canal originates in or is destined for the US, making the Panama Canal vital to US supply chains”[36]. Panama entered also the “Belt and Road Initiative” trap programme, which is a well-designed economic war against the West. If the Trump administration would have not been reacting in February so categorically that Panama must retreat from the giant economic trap, China could have been able to use Panama Canal as a counterbalance to the Malacca Strait. In other words, because the United States is able to block the Malacca Strait in case of a conflict with China, China would have been able to respond with blocking the Panama Canal, doing damage to the United States.
4. The Suez Canal, a very important strategic point that will certainly be supervised by the United States’ Intelligence Community. With a former British rule over the Canal, Egypt nationalized the Canal in 1956, during the time of a ruthless dictator, Gamal Abdel Naseer, a man very close with the Soviet Union. This canal was a source of major wars, called the Arab-Israeli Wars, in the 20th century. The Suez Canal is vital to maritime trade because it is used for approximately 12-15% of the worldwide trade and more than 1 trillion goods in a year[37].
5. Bab el-Mendab, a highly important strategic point, located between Djibouti, Yemen, Somalia, and Eritrea, because it connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea. A paper, written by Colonel Staff Hussain Al-Yadoomi of the Yemen Armed Forces and published by the U.S. Army War College, represents the key to understanding the importance of this strategic point: “the industrialized Western European countries have geopolitical requirements in the Red Sea, because they mainly depend on the Gulf petroleum to meet their energy needs”[38]. When it comes to the crucial economic importance, this strait controls more than 10% of the worldwide trade: “Accounting for around 10% to 12% of worldwide trade movement, the waterways are not only a key transit area but also a focal point for piracy, armed conflicts, and the power projection of major naval powers. As per the latest reports, over 7 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil flows through Bab al-Mandab, making it a critical maritime chokepoint”[39]. When speaking about the maritime trade, almost 25% is crossing this critical point[40]. If we speak about Europe, Germany’s commerce is concentrated also in this area: “Almost 10 percent of all imports to Germany come via by sea via the Red Sea (Suez Canal and Strait of Bab el-Mandeb) […] That represents a trading volume of EUR 136 billion in 2023, according to a recent study by the ifo Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy”[41].
6. South China Sea, an extremely important strategic point for communist China, but also for the United States. Since the year 2000, China talked about its ‘maritime sovereignty’ more and more in its strategic documents and considered the South China Sea its own ‘place of business’, not taking into consideration other states that have the right to make trade with the help of this sea. According to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, this influence that China wanted in the South China Sea is as old as the year 1947, when there was still the conflict between the Communist faction of Mao Zedong and the Guomindang faction of Chang-Kai Shek[42]. Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia are deeply affected by Chinese pressure and Chinese influence. The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is describing why the South China Sea has such strategic importance: “Approximately one-third of the world’s crude oil exports are transported by sea through the South China Sea; the most important sea routes for goods and raw material transports from Europe and Africa towards Asia lead through this area. It has rich fish stocks, and large oil and gas deposits are suspected”[43]. There are also present a series of territorial disputes: Paracel Islands (controlled by China but disputed between China and Vietnam[44]), Spratly Islands (“claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, while parts are also claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei”[45]) and Scarborough Shoal (controlled by China but claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines[46]). Since 2012, China began the construction of artificial islands within the South China Sea, and, unfortunately, neither the United States nor the West as a whole did absolutely nothing not only to prevent this, but also not imposing any sanctions whatsoever;
7. East China Sea, the other string of what China is doing in terms of disrupting maritime commerce and extending its influence. Apart from the fact that the United States has strategic military bases in Japan and the Philippines, the US has to do everything in its power to stop the influence of China towards Japan and the Philippines because of possible economic disruptions and military threats. Within this strategic point, there are also a series of territorial disputes: Senkaku Islands (“claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan, and administered by Japan”[47]) and Diaoyu Islands (claimed both by Japan and China[48]). The East China Sea is extremely important for its natural resources: “Hydrocarbon reserves in the ECS are difficult to estimate, but EIA estimates the East China Sea contains 60-100 million barrels of oil in proven and probable reserves, and 1-2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven and probable natural gas reserves […] Chinese sources estimate as much as 70-160 billion barrels of oil and 250 Tcf of natural gas in undiscovered, technically recoverable resources”[49].
8. Taiwan Strait, a very disputed strategic point because of China’s growing influence within the area and because of its assertiveness and aggressiveness around the peninsula. William J. Burns, the former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Biden administration, spoke during a speech at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service about some findings that are extremely disturbing not only for Taiwan but also for the entire world: Xi Jinping, the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, made the statement that until 2027, China should retake what is its own: Taiwan, or, in his words, “reunification”: “We know, as a matter of intelligence, that he’s instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion”[50]. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Taiwan produces over 90 percent of the most cutting-edge chips used in smartphones, data centers, and advanced military equipment. Disruptions to the supply of these technologies could wipe trillions of dollars from global GDP. It is a critical hub for other goods as well. CSIS estimates that Taiwan’s ports handled approximately $586 billion worth of trade in 2022, including transshipments between other economies”[51]. I will extend this subject when I will arrive to Taiwan as a surprise of the national security strategy.
9. The Arctic Routes (Bering Strait and the Northern Sea routes), strategic points in Northern Europe with increasing importance in the future because of the process of melting. These strategic points have to be controlled immediately by the United States because of the growing influence of communist China in the region. China is doing everything in its power to find alternative routes to the Malacca Strait. Therefore, it extends its “Belt and Road Initiative” process also into the north part of the globe: “If China gets more and more influence in the council, this could provide China with a perfect alternative route, starting from the Philippine Sea- North Pacific Ocean- Bering Sea- Chukchi Sea (going through the canal between Russia and the US, between Russia and the Alaska region)- Kara Sea (Russia)- Greenland Waters”[52].
10. Strait of Gibraltar, one of the crucial European strategic points, situated between Spain and Morocco, makes the connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. In terms of the sea traffic, “up to 100,000 vessels navigate the strait annually, accounting for 10% of international maritime traffic”[53]. “By connecting the Mediterranean with the Atlantic, its use is imperative for trade between Southern Europe and North Africa with America; at the same time, it is the shortest maritime route between Southeast Asia and the Atlantic coasts of Europe, Africa, and the American continent”[54].
11. Turkish Straits (Bosporus & Dardanelles), the most important strategic point regarding Southern and Eastern Europe because of the link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, represents a geographical point that has direct consequences on the states that have access to the Black Sea. The Russian Federation does everything to gain more access to the Black Sea with its warships, but, luckily, Turkey is there to block these movements through the Montreaux Convention of 1936. However, NATO ships are also limited because of the Convention, which gives Turkey the main influence. This should be a critical point to be controlled by the United States in order to make sure that no Russian warship goes beyond the Turkish Strait,s but also to extend its influence within the area.
12. Cape of Good Hope. Because of the growing geopolitical conflicts, the Cape of Good Hope is more and more important in the international arena. Conflicts surrounding the Red Sea and the Suez area are disrupting traditional routes. In terms of its importance for the United States, it can be important if China decides to divert its traditional trade lines following the Malacca Strait and tries to extend its influence around this strategic point: “In 2023, ship transits through these canals dropped by about half, forcing costly rerouting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. By mid-2024, Suez transits fell further, with ship capacity (tonnage) crossing the Gulf of Aden down 76% and tonnage transiting the Suez Canal cut by 70%. Cape of Good Hope arrivals surged 89%[55]”.
In terms of economic security, the new strategy also mentions “Reindustrialization,” and the key point is the fact that the US will make big steps to “re-shore” the industrial production that it has externalized throughout the past decades. Since 1978, more and more companies have been offshored to China and to other parts for cheaper labor. The main disadvantage is the fact that the industrial strength of a country that externalizes much of its companies to authoritarian or totalitarian countries will become more and more dependent on the laws, rules and regulations of that country. Therefore, intellectual theft or nationalization can represent real dangers. “Reviving our Defense Industrial Base” follows the same logic. When it comes to “Energy Dominance”, this is a vital point made by the United States because the country will focus on cheap energy, which will no longer be dominated by the rhetoric of “climate change” or “green energy”. Coal, gas, oil, and nuclear energy will become, once more, the key energy sources for the United States. This will not only lower the prices at home, but it will also extend the US influence in terms of trade, commerce, and deepen the relationship with the allies. A crucial point made by the US is the fact that it “the disastrous <<climate change>> and <<Net Zero>> ideologies that have so greatly harmed Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidize our adversaries”. This is the point I also made in the past: the EU politics of “green energy” not only destroyed the huge advantage that the EU had in the past in terms of comparative advantage, but the EU became more and more dependent on China because China was the one manufacturing most of the goods that were in accordance with the “green” rhetoric. Yes, what I am saying, is that the EU made a huge strategic mistake, importing more and more core materials and finished products without even taking into account that at the top of the Chinese leadership, the ruler is the Chinese Communist Party, who killed between 70 and 100 million people since its founding. And yes, the EU made business deals with this communist monster without having any remorse or second thoughts, without ethics, and without moral barriers. And not only did the EU do this, but also the United States within the Bill Clinton administration, George W. Bush Jr. administration, and Obama administration. All of the Western leadership is to blame for what is happening right now.
When it comes to the economic security principle, there is not a big difference between what is written in the former national security strategy of 2017. Now, the tone expressed is much more brutal because the situation is worse than 8 years ago. In terms of economic security, the former national security strategy al talked about the dependencies between the United States and other countries. The only difference is in the way in which this priority is expressed. This is how the former strategy looked at the subject of ‘economic security’: “The erosion of American manufacturing over the last two decades, however, has had a negative impact on these capabilities and threatens to undermine the ability of U.S. manufacturers to meet national security requirements. […] As America’s manufacturing base has weakened, so too have critical workforce skills ranging from industrial welding to high-technology skills for cybersecurity and aerospace. Support for a vibrant domestic manufacturing sector, a solid defense industrial base, and resilient supply chains is a national priority”[56]. In order to correct this, the strategy proposes the following steps: “The United States will promote policies and incentives that return key national security industries to American shores. Where possible, the U.S. Government will work with industry partners to strengthen U.S. competitiveness in key technologies and manufacturing capabilities”. Once more, we see the word “partners”. In the old strategy, we see this word more often that in the new strategy.
[1] Ibidem, p. 4
[2] Ibidem, p. 4
[3] Ibidem, p. 4
[4] Ibidem, p. 4
[5] “The US-Central Asia summit: The end of the beginning”, Eurasianet, 7th November 2025, accessed at https://eurasianet.org/the-us-central-asia-summit-the-end-of-the-beginning on 13.12.2025
[6] Ibidem
[7] Ibidem, p. 9
[8] Mihai-Gabriel CRAINICU, “2025: Donald Trump, Realism and the Return of Geopolitics at the International Roundtable (I)”, 19.01.2025, accessed at https://linkinpolitics.com/2025/01/19/2025-donald-trump-realism-and-the-return-of-geopolitics-at-the-international-roundtable-i/ on 06.12.2025
[9] John J MEARSHEIMER, “Structural Realism” in Tim DUNNE, Milja KURKi , and Steve SMITH (ed.), “International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity”, Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, p. 79
[10] Ibidem, p. 91
[11] Ibidem, p. 80
[12] Kenneth N. WALTZ, “Theory of International Politics”, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 126, accessed at https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20Addison-Wesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%20%20%20%201979.pdf on 13.12.2025
[13] Ibidem, p. 119
[14] Ibidem, p. 103
[15] Ibidem, p. 106
[16] Ibidem, p. 10
[17] Ibidem, p. 1
[18] Ibidem, p. II
[19] Ibidem, p. 8
[20] Ibidem, p. 9
[21] Ibidem, p. 9
[22] Ibidem, p. 4
[23] Ibidem, p. 10
[24] Ibidem, p. 11
[25] Ibidem, p. 4
[26] Ibidem, p. 9
[27] Ibidem, p. 12
[28] Ibidem, p. 12
[29] Ibidem, p. 12
[30] Ibidem, p. 12
[31] Ibidem, p. 48
[32] Ibidem, p. 13
[33] Ibidem, p. 13
[34] Gabriel LANE, “Navigating the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ in 2025”, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 4th March 2025, accessed at https://atlasinstitute.org/navigating-the-malacca-dilemma-in-2025/#:~:text=The%20’Dilemma’%20The%20Malacca%20Strait%20is%20a,Party%20(CCP)%20officials%20in%20Beijing%20(Parrot%2C%202024). on 07.12.2025
[35] Lauren Dagan AMOS, “The Strait of Hormuz and the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Shockwaves”, The Diplomat, 24th June 2025, accessed athttps://thediplomat.com/2025/06/the-strait-of-hormuz-and-the-indo-pacific-strategic-shockwaves/ on 07.12.2025
[36] “The Panama Canal: Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?”, European Parliamentary Research Service , 13th May 2025, accessed at https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/13/the-panama-canal-panamas-sovereign-rights-under-threat/ on 07.12.2025
[37] Racha HELWA, Perrihan AL-RIFFAI, “A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world”, The Atlantic Council, 20th March 2025, accessed at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ on 07.12.2025
[38] Hussain AL-YADOOMI, U.S. Army War College, 1991, p. 4, accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA236804.pdf on 07.12.2025
[39] “The Implications of Escalating Maritime Threats in Bab al-Mandab”, Rasanah International Institute for Iranian Studies, 24th December 2023, accessed at https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/monitoring-and-translation/reports/the-implications-of-escalating-maritime-threats-in-bab-al-mandab/ on 07.12.2025
[40] “Cuál es la importancia estratégica del estrecho de Mandeb, la zona en que los hutíes atacan a los barcos en el mar Rojo”, BBC, 14th January 2024, accessed at https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/czv5qr1xwvxo on 07.12.2025
[41] “German Economy Dependent on Maritime Trade in the Red Sea”, IFO Institute, 20th August 2025, accessed at https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-08-20/german-economy-dependent-maritime-trade-red-sea on 07.12.2025
[42] Jan SENKYR, David MERKLE, “Geopolitik im Südchinesischen Meer“, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 3, accessed at https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/22161843/Geopolitik+im++S%C3%BCdchinesischen+Meer.pdf/c590b558-2178-5f79-d6a7-37cdc1eb72fd?version=1.2&t=1692116875510 on 07.12.2025
[43] Ibidem, p. 3
[44] “U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 5th February 2024, p. 7, accessed at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42784.pdf on 07.12.2025
[45] Ibidem, p. 7
[46] Ibidem, p. 7
[47] Ibidem, p. 7
[48] “In multiple messages, Biden warns Beijing over expansionism”, The Straits Times, 29th January 2021, accessed at https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/in-multiple-messsages-biden-warns-beijing-over-expansionism on 07.12.2025
[49] Nabel AKRAM, “Geostrategic Importance and Natural Reserves of East China Sea”, Modern Diplomacy, 14th February 2022, accessed at https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/02/14/geostrategic-importance-and-natural-reserves-of-east-china-sea/ on 07.12.2025
[50] “Trainor Award Ceremony in Honor of William J. Burns”, Central Intelligence Agency, 14th February 2023, p. 16, accessed at https://www.cia.gov/static/Transcript-Trainor-Awards-Ceremony-IHO-WJB.pdf on 07.12.2025
[51] Matthew P. FUNAIOLE, Brian HART, David PENG, Bonny LIN, and Jasper VERSCHUUR,“Crossroads of Commerce: How the Taiwan Strait Propels the Global Economy”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Part 3 of a ChinaPower series, 10th October 2024, accessed at https://features.csis.org/chinapower/china-taiwan-strait-trade/ on 07.12.2025
[52] Ibidem
[53] S. INESTA, “El tráfico marítimo en el Estrecho de Gibraltar de tres años en unos segundos”, Ceuta Actualidad, 8th November 2025, accessed at https://www.ceutaactualidad.com/articulo/otras-noticias/trafico-maritimo-estrecho-gibraltar-anos-segundos/20231108003648175323.html on 07.12.2025
[54] Patricia Giersiepen GARCIA, “Aspectos estratégicos del estrecho de Gibraltar”, Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies, Universidad de Navarra Facultad de Derecho – Relaciones Internacionales, September 2024, accessed at https://www.unav.edu/documents/16800098/17755721/aspectos-estrategicos-estrecho-gibraltar.pdf on 07.12.2025
[55] “Review of Maritime Transport 2024”, UN Trade and Development, accessed at https://unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2024 on 07.12.2025
[56] Ibidem, pp. 28-29
