Game theory and the decision-making process influence almost every aspect of our lives. From what type of food to eat and what type of philosophy are you interested in to which is the best course of action to take within a business or a national governmental system, game theory, and decision-making are inevitable in finding the best course of action. The decision-making behavior is either based on objective matters, but also on subjective reality. The decision-maker should have a specific decision logic and a specific target, but there are a lot of unforeseeable events, which can impact decisively the decision-making process.
Within this article, I chose to make a parallel between the realm of international relations and security studies with the game theory, explaining, for example, why a country is able to block or limit the decision-making process of an international organization. In our case, how Hungary is able to block the decisions of the European Union regarding the economic sanctions toward Russia in the current context of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. In order to explain this mechanism, I will resort to the voting system used by the EU, hence taking into consideration the political application of the game theory and decision-making process.
Perceived by the European community as an illiberal regime or as “Putin’s ‘Trojan horse’ in Europe”[1], Hungary represents the ‘rebel’ of the European Union regarding its close relationships with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. For example, last month, Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, participated in the Belt and Road Summit in Beijing, in the context of the increase of China’s assertiveness toward the Western democracies, especially the United States. Because of its huge dependence on Russian gas and oil, Hungary is either blocking or limiting the European packages of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, justifying its actions by putting the national interest of Hungary above the EU interest as a whole. According to the European Policy Centre, one of the main think tanks around Brussels, the EU did not ban the total amount of oil coming from Russia because of Orban’s continuous denial. Henceforth, the Druzhba pipeline, which “delivers Russian crude oil to Hungary”[2] was exempted from the 6th package of sanctions. More specifically, according to question number E-002408/2022 of the European Parliament to the European Commission, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia will cut crude oil delivered to the member states “with a temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline”[3]. The answer of the European Commission justified the need for exemption because of the geographic position of the member states and because of the “lack of existence of viable alternative supply routes to compensate for crude oil imports […] from Russia”[4].
Regarding the voting procedures of the European Council, depending on the issue at hand, the Council has 3 main voting procedures: the simple majority (“14 member states vote in favour”[5]), the qualified majority (“55% of member states, representing at least 65% of the EU population”[6]) or unanimous vote (it will pass, only if all the members of the Council are in favor). The unanimous rule is applied in certain sensible matters, including the common foreign and security policy, EU membership, and EU finances[7]. Therefore, the decision-making process taken in the context of the economic sanctions against Russia falls in the category of the common and foreign security policy, so the unanimous rule is applied. If a country is rejecting one of the proposals being presented during a meeting of this nature within the Council, the proposal is rejected. In our context, if Hungary is the only country against any of the proposals made by the member states present at the table of decisions, the member states are obliged to withdraw their proposals and take into consideration the position of Hungary.
The European Policy Centre, recommends the reevaluation of the unanimity rule of the Council regarding the European common foreign and security policy in order not to let Hungary limit the decision-making behavior and processes. Moreover, it recommends replacing the unanimity rule with the qualified majority rule, meaning based on the positive vote of at least 55% of member states, which must represent at least 65% of the EU population[8].
In conclusion, game theory and the decision-making process are applied within a large spectrum of areas: day-to-day life, clothing preferences, social preferences, but also the international political arena, as seen in the debate regarding the way in which a country is able to block or limit the decision-making process of an international organization, which is deeply involved within the international sanctioning process against the Russian Federation, in the context of the war in Ukraine.
[1] Perle PETIT, “What should the EU do about Hungary’s illiberal turn?”, European Policy Centre, p. 4, accessed at https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/DP_Hungary_s_illiberal_turn.pdf on 20.11.2023
[2] Ibidem, p. 5
[3] Eva KAILI, “The EU’s sixth package of sanctions against Russia. Question for written answer E-002408/2022
to the Commission”, European Parliament, accessed at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002408_EN.html on 21.11.2023
[4]“Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission”, 19.08.2022, accessed at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002408-ASW_EN.html on 21.11.2023
[5] “Voting System”, European Council, accessed at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/ on 21.11.2023
[6] Ibidem
[7] “Unanimity”, European Council, accessed at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/unanimity/ on 21.11.2023
[8] Ibidem
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