We begin the final part of the article by briefly recapping the topics we have touched upon in our brief exploration of the world of intelligence services. So, in the previous articles, we have shown that intelligence services play a very important role in maintaining a climate of security in any democratic state, and that in their recurring activities, especially in the collection of information, the workers within intelligence agencies engage in activities that can be considered sensitive, particularly from the perspective of maintaining the balance between pursuing and achieving professional objectives and adhering to constitutional rules, especially those related to handling sensitive data concerning citizens of the states.
We have also discussed that there can be sensitive moments in the activities of workers within intelligence services, as we presented in the second part, theoretically, there are several filters that come into play when the balance we mentioned earlier is lost and allows for abuse. Units within intelligence services with a role in internal protection and oversight committees of intelligence activities play a crucial role in restoring balance and sanctioning abuse of power.
While it is more challenging to discuss specialized structures within intelligence services with a role in internal protection due to the secretive nature of their activities, we will focus a little on the activities of the parliamentary committees that ensure the oversight of intelligence apparatus.
We all have vivid images in mind of the moments when directors of American intelligence services are called to testify before the U.S. Congress, and they are questioned, even pressured, with various questions related to the activities of the services they oversee. What is fascinating is not only the questions asked in the most exhaustive manner but also the answers provided by those being questioned. Respondents are well aware that before Congress, the most representative body of American democracy, there is no room for lies and omissions. Thus, both oversight committees and the controlled intelligence agencies conduct these activities in the most responsible manner.
Translating this to other democratic countries, we can affirm that from the perspective of citizens’ needs and interests, the activities of oversight committees of intelligence services should take into account the following elements:
- Activities should be carried out as honestly as possible, without biases, and investigations should be conducted with full respect for the laws and the Constitution, both in letter and in spirit.
- There should be as much transparency as possible so that citizens can have a clearer picture of the committees’ activities and the performance of intelligence services.
- Committees should strive to identify legislative shortcomings governing the activities of the services and propose updates to the laws.
- Considering that workers within the intelligence services typically have military status and cannot be part of unions or movements to defend their rights, oversight committees believe they could also play a role in advocating for and supporting intelligence officers, promoting their interests.
- Oversight committees should consist of parliamentarians with extensive experience in national security-related fields and demonstrate without reservation that they are independent and serve only the general, constitutional interest.
- The actual oversight activity should not be purely formal but should aim to rectify and sanction identified shortcomings when necessary.
All of the above aspects serve to strengthen citizens’ trust in intelligence services. The more we have oversight committees that conduct their activities in an honest and democracy-oriented manner, the more states will have a climate of security in which abuses can be prevented early and without negative consequences.
